ww1 - causes
The Moroccan Crises:
1905-6 & 1911
THE MOROCCAN CRISES.
The independence of the strategically important North African state of Morocco (check your maps) had been guaranteed by the Madrid Convention of 1880 to which both France and Germany had agreed. As well as offering some strategic leverage over the entry to the Mediterranean, Morocco also promised some economic advantage through exploitation of the last “unclaimed” area of Africa.
Who would be interested in the possible strategic advantages offered by Morocco?
The policy that Germany had followed under Bismark’s direction was to isolate France and retain friendship with Russia, but when Kaiser Wilhelm 11 came to power in June 1888 he dropped this policy. In March 1891 Germany was to renew the Reinsurance Pact with Russia but decided to allow this arrangement, the keystone of Bismark’s policy to protect Germany’s interests in Europe, to lapse. It is difficult to explain this decision by Germany in any terms other than diplomatic blundering.
What “message” was the Kaiser sending the Russians?
How did they respond?
Sir Edward Grey, when discussing British foreign policy in 1911, made reference to 1892 as the year that Britain moved away from support for the Triple Alliance, of Germany, Italy and Austria-Hungary, which until then had represented stability in Europe. The coincidence of the Kaiser’s decision in 1891 and the destabilising of Europe is difficult to ignore. The Kaiser believed that the alliance with Russia was a liability for a continuing alliance with Austria-Hungary. The Kaiser believed that the maintenance of Austria-Hungary’s status as a great power was important for Germany’s security in Europe.
Did a German alliance with Austria-Hungary preclude alliance with Russia?
How important was Austria-Hungary to Germany’s security?
Whatever Germany’s motives in allowing the treaty with Russia to lapse, this move allowed France the opportunity to end its isolation in Europe by cultivating friendship and eventually alliance with Russia.
Why was France “isolated”?
Why did France seek allies?
Colonial rivalry between Great Britain and France had intensified since the British occupation of Egypt in May 1882. The climax of this rivalry came in September 1898 at Fashoda in the Upper Sudan. War was avoided on this occasion and relations began to normalise. The French who had lost their “rights” in Egypt, obviously sought some replacement…Morocco appears to have been their target. France would allow Great Britain to enjoy exclusive “rights” in Egypt in return for increased access to Morocco. Great Britain was at war with the Boers in South Africa a year later, in 1899.
Why was Egypt of such concern to both Britain and France?
France was recovering from a number of major national scandals that occurred during the 1880s and 1890s. These internal problems had made it difficult for France to follow a “strong” line in foreign affairs. France could not stand up to the British if the parliament would not vote the funds necessary to equip the army and navy! With restored internal political stability and Britain occupied in South Africa, France managed secretly to detach Italy from its alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary.
Great Britain recognised its diplomatic isolation during the Boer War (1899 – 1902) in South Africa. The international reaction to the war and the threat of intervention by various European powers caused a rethink of Britain’s policy of “splendid isolation”. Previously Britain had remained out of European affairs, intervening only when necessary to settle problems that threatened the stability of the continent or, perhaps threatened the security of the English Channel.
Was there a threat to the stability of Europe at this stage?
Was the security of the Channel at risk?
The outbreak of war between Russia and Japan in 1904 inspired Great Britain and France to enter an agreement to avoid involvement in the war by sorting out their longterm colonial disputes in North Africa, South-East Asia, the Pacific, West Africa and Egypt. The direction of British foreign policy was not immediately obvious since negotiations with both Germany and France continued until the Moroccan crisis of 1905. The announcement in 1906 of a new German naval reform plan seemed to harden Great Britain’s connection with France.
Why was there naval rivalry between Britain and Germany?
France may have been provocative in its activities in Morocco in 1904 and 1905. France may have decided its new understanding with Britain could be tested against the international community that was supposed to guarantee the independence of Morocco.
Germany probably was not expected to be overly concerned about Morocco since in the past Chancellor Bismark made it plain that Germany considered France to have a preferred position in Morocco. The “new” German Chancellor, Von Bulow, decided however to test the strength of the new Franco-British agreement. Without this incident it is possible that Great Britain and France would have done nothing more to formalise their connection. The war in the Far East between Russia and Japan, which inspired the “entente” was over in September 1905.
Were French actions in Morocco provocative?
Did the Kaiser again “blunder” by involving Germany in affairs that did not really concern Germany?
The call by Germany for an international conference carried the implication that refusal by France could result in war with Germany.
What was Germany’s motive for calling for an international conference to sort out the Moroccan problem?
How successful was Germany at the Algeciras conference?
Why were France and Russia becoming so closely aligned?
The full impact of the blundering “diplomacy” of the Kaiser and his ministers was shown up when Great Britain and Russia began to negotiate a settlement of their long term disputes about the Middle East, Far East and India. There were economic considerations for Britain as well but this incident is referred to by Sir Edward Grey as the crucial point at which the direction of British foreign policy was decided.
This agreement meant Russia would no longer threaten northern India. Russia was unable to pursue her ambitions in the Far East after the defeat by Japan and now resolved to concentrate on the Black Sea area. This refocusing would cause increased opposition from Austria-Hungary. An entente with Great Britain would increase the diplomatic muscle Russia could call upon to assist against Austria-Hungary. In return for this “muscle” Russia gave up the unrealistic idea that she could fight a war against Great Britain over their various colonial disputes.
This alliance, which would eventually become the Triple Entente, had two longterm results for the powers of Europe. Firstly, the major source and focus of European rivalry in the future would be in Europe not in the far flung empires in Africa and the Far East. Secondly, the source of rivalry would be between the two alliances, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente.
Why would Germany have announced its naval reform program at this stage?
What were the consequences for Germany of its involvement in the “Moroccan Crisis” of 1905/1906?
The Balkan Wars:
1912 & 1913
Belligerence in the balkans
The scramble for Africa had caused many international clashes between Europe’s great powers and the scramble for China had triggered a war between Russia and Japan, but the scramble for the decrepit, ailing Turkish Ottoman empire could not be contained locally and peacefully. The First World War that began in 1914 was in fact the Third Balkan War that got out of hand.
As the European remnant of the Ottoman empire gradually decayed, its subject peoples periodically rose in rebellion to fight for their freedom and independence. One by one new states were created in the Balkans – Greece, Roumania, Serbia, Bulgaria – all at the expense of Turkey and with the support of the interested great power neighbours, Russia and Austria, who looked on them as potential clients.
Greece owed its existence largely to Britain; Russia promoted the aspirations of fellow Orthodox Slavs, the Serbs and Bulgarians; and Austria championed captive Catholic Croats. British leaders were torn between two contradictory responses: their sympathy with Christian freedom fighters and disgust with Turkish barbarity on the one hand and their fear of a Russian break-out into warm waters of the Mediterranean on the other.
However, since 1890 and the fall of Bismarck (who said he would not sacrifice the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier in the Balkans), Germany had begun to occupy a vacuum left there by gradual British withdrawal. Twice Kaiser William II visited Turkey on friendship missions and German bankers and business men became increasingly involved in building a new railway across Turkish Asian territory. In particular, they favoured an ambitious project that would link Constantinople with Baghdad and eventually Basra on the Persian Gulf. This raised yet another issue of Anglo-German rivalry and mutual mistrust. Now that the Royal Navy was preparing to convert its new warships from coal to oil, in London there were fears that the Germans might grab Mesopotamia’s (Iraq’s) oil fields for themselves.
More alarmingly, especially to the Russians whose trade through the Straits was vital to their economy, was a German military mission to Constantinople, which caused a diplomatic crisis in December 1913. Tsar Nicholas was afraid that the Germans intended to take over the Bosphorus/Dardanelles passage and shut his navy permanently in the Black Sea.
The final episode in this extended narrative of Ottoman decline and disintegration started in October 1911 when the Italians suddenly invaded and eventually conquered with difficulty Turkey’s only remaining North African colony, Libya. Ominously, whereas previous outside assaults on the Ottomans, usually by the Russians, had brought France or Great Britain or both to the aid of “Johnny Turk”, this time Italy was allowed a free hand. What was left of the empire was “up for grabs” since its condition was now seen as terminal. The traditional guardian of “the sick man of Europe”, once Great Britain, was now Germany, Italy’s ally.
Yet even before the Turks had been forced to sign away both Libya and the Dodecanese Aegean islands to Italy, more wolves had caught the smell of easy meat. Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece had formed a military pact, the Balkan League, to drive the Ottoman empire right out of Europe for ever.
Though the Turks were decisively defeated on all fronts, Serbia and Bulgaria fell out over some of the spoils: both coveted Macedonia. Also, Bulgaria’s huge territorial gains excited the envy of their neighbours and in the summer of 1913 Roumania, Greece, Serbia and Turkey joined forces to tear pieces out of its newly acquired lands. Bulgaria lost everything won in the First Balkan War; Serbia was doubled in size; Greece got Salonika; and the Turks held on to Adrianpole, their last toehold in Europe.
But the voracious, landlocked Serbs were still not satisfied: they demanded access to the Adriatic sea which the Austrians would not allow. Finally, after a prolonged deadlock, Serbia gave way to the superior, stubborn strength of the Austrians. The coast of the Adriatic between Austrian Dalmatia and Greece was given to Albania, a new, independent sovereign state.
However, Serbian resentment against Austria intensified and now centred on the disputed provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Here, in 1875, a rising against Turkish rule had been ruthlessly suppressed and three years later a great power congress at Berlin presided over by Bismarck had placed both provinces under the military authority of Vienna.
Though less than half their population were Serbian, most of them peasants, a quarter Turkish Muslim and another quarter Croat, Serb nationalists were passionately convinced that Bosnia and Herzegovina were historically and morally part of a greater Serbian state. So that after the Austrians suddenly and unilaterally annexed them in 1908 there could be no reconciliation between Vienna and Belgrade.
Austria’s seizure of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a crucial turning-point in European power politics. When Serbia and Russia protested vigorously Germany took Austria’s side and they were compelled to back down. Humiliated recently by the Japanese in the Far East and conceding to Britain limits to their expansion in the Middle East, the Russians revived their traditional ambitions in the Balkans. From now on St Petersburg gave unqualified support to their Slav “brothers”, particularly the Serbs. In doing so, there was a conspicuous increase in the size of Russia’s armed forces, both land and sea, which during the years from 1910 to 1914 set off a European arms race.
So by 1914 the guns were loaded, the lines were drawn and suspicion, fear and intolerance were poisoning relations between the greater and smaller European states. Not much more would be needed for someone to pull a trigger and blow peace away: leaders and governments had run out of safety catches.
As the European remnant of the Ottoman empire gradually decayed, its subject peoples periodically rose in rebellion to fight for their freedom and independence. One by one new states were created in the Balkans – Greece, Roumania, Serbia, Bulgaria – all at the expense of Turkey and with the support of the interested great power neighbours, Russia and Austria, who looked on them as potential clients.
Greece owed its existence largely to Britain; Russia promoted the aspirations of fellow Orthodox Slavs, the Serbs and Bulgarians; and Austria championed captive Catholic Croats. British leaders were torn between two contradictory responses: their sympathy with Christian freedom fighters and disgust with Turkish barbarity on the one hand and their fear of a Russian break-out into warm waters of the Mediterranean on the other.
However, since 1890 and the fall of Bismarck (who said he would not sacrifice the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier in the Balkans), Germany had begun to occupy a vacuum left there by gradual British withdrawal. Twice Kaiser William II visited Turkey on friendship missions and German bankers and business men became increasingly involved in building a new railway across Turkish Asian territory. In particular, they favoured an ambitious project that would link Constantinople with Baghdad and eventually Basra on the Persian Gulf. This raised yet another issue of Anglo-German rivalry and mutual mistrust. Now that the Royal Navy was preparing to convert its new warships from coal to oil, in London there were fears that the Germans might grab Mesopotamia’s (Iraq’s) oil fields for themselves.
More alarmingly, especially to the Russians whose trade through the Straits was vital to their economy, was a German military mission to Constantinople, which caused a diplomatic crisis in December 1913. Tsar Nicholas was afraid that the Germans intended to take over the Bosphorus/Dardanelles passage and shut his navy permanently in the Black Sea.
The final episode in this extended narrative of Ottoman decline and disintegration started in October 1911 when the Italians suddenly invaded and eventually conquered with difficulty Turkey’s only remaining North African colony, Libya. Ominously, whereas previous outside assaults on the Ottomans, usually by the Russians, had brought France or Great Britain or both to the aid of “Johnny Turk”, this time Italy was allowed a free hand. What was left of the empire was “up for grabs” since its condition was now seen as terminal. The traditional guardian of “the sick man of Europe”, once Great Britain, was now Germany, Italy’s ally.
Yet even before the Turks had been forced to sign away both Libya and the Dodecanese Aegean islands to Italy, more wolves had caught the smell of easy meat. Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece had formed a military pact, the Balkan League, to drive the Ottoman empire right out of Europe for ever.
Though the Turks were decisively defeated on all fronts, Serbia and Bulgaria fell out over some of the spoils: both coveted Macedonia. Also, Bulgaria’s huge territorial gains excited the envy of their neighbours and in the summer of 1913 Roumania, Greece, Serbia and Turkey joined forces to tear pieces out of its newly acquired lands. Bulgaria lost everything won in the First Balkan War; Serbia was doubled in size; Greece got Salonika; and the Turks held on to Adrianpole, their last toehold in Europe.
But the voracious, landlocked Serbs were still not satisfied: they demanded access to the Adriatic sea which the Austrians would not allow. Finally, after a prolonged deadlock, Serbia gave way to the superior, stubborn strength of the Austrians. The coast of the Adriatic between Austrian Dalmatia and Greece was given to Albania, a new, independent sovereign state.
However, Serbian resentment against Austria intensified and now centred on the disputed provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Here, in 1875, a rising against Turkish rule had been ruthlessly suppressed and three years later a great power congress at Berlin presided over by Bismarck had placed both provinces under the military authority of Vienna.
Though less than half their population were Serbian, most of them peasants, a quarter Turkish Muslim and another quarter Croat, Serb nationalists were passionately convinced that Bosnia and Herzegovina were historically and morally part of a greater Serbian state. So that after the Austrians suddenly and unilaterally annexed them in 1908 there could be no reconciliation between Vienna and Belgrade.
Austria’s seizure of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a crucial turning-point in European power politics. When Serbia and Russia protested vigorously Germany took Austria’s side and they were compelled to back down. Humiliated recently by the Japanese in the Far East and conceding to Britain limits to their expansion in the Middle East, the Russians revived their traditional ambitions in the Balkans. From now on St Petersburg gave unqualified support to their Slav “brothers”, particularly the Serbs. In doing so, there was a conspicuous increase in the size of Russia’s armed forces, both land and sea, which during the years from 1910 to 1914 set off a European arms race.
So by 1914 the guns were loaded, the lines were drawn and suspicion, fear and intolerance were poisoning relations between the greater and smaller European states. Not much more would be needed for someone to pull a trigger and blow peace away: leaders and governments had run out of safety catches.
Who Started ww1?
- 10 historians -
Sir Max Hastings - military historian
Germany
No one nation deserves all responsibility for the outbreak of war, but Germany seems to me to deserve most.
It alone had power to halt the descent to disaster at any time in July 1914 by withdrawing its "blank cheque" which offered support to Austria for its invasion of Serbia.
I'm afraid I am unconvinced by the argument that Serbia was a rogue state which deserved its nemesis at Austria's hands. And I do not believe Russia wanted a European war in 1914 - its leaders knew that it would have been in a far stronger position to fight two years later, having completed its rearmament programme.
The question of whether Britain was obliged to join the European conflict which became inevitable by 1 August is almost a separate issue. In my own view neutrality was not a credible option because a Germany victorious on the continent would never afterwards have accommodated a Britain which still dominated the oceans and global financial system.
Sir Richard J Evans - Regius professor of history, University of Cambridge
Serbia
Serbia bore the greatest responsibility for the outbreak of WW1. Serbian nationalism and expansionism were profoundly disruptive forces and Serbian backing for the Black Hand terrorists was extraordinarily irresponsible. Austria-Hungary bore only slightly less responsibility for its panic over-reaction to the assassination of the heir to the Habsburg throne.
France encouraged Russia's aggressiveness towards Austria-Hungary and Germany encouraged Austrian intransigence. Britain failed to mediate as it had done in the previous Balkan crisis out of fear of Germany's European and global ambitions - a fear that was not entirely rational since Britain had clearly won the naval arms race by 1910.
Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria
The generally positive attitude of European statesmen towards war, based on notions of honour, expectations of a swift victory, and ideas of social Darwinism, was perhaps the most important conditioning factor. It is very important to look at the outbreak of the war in the round and to avoid reading back later developments - the German September Programme for example (an early statement of their war aims) - into the events of July-August 1914.
Dr Heather Jones - associate professor in international history, LSEAustria-Hungary,
Germany and Russia
A handful of bellicose political and military decision-makers in Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia caused WW1.
Relatively common before 1914, assassinations of royal figures did not normally result in war. But Austria-Hungary's military hawks - principal culprits for the conflict - saw the Sarajevo assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife by a Bosnian Serb as an excuse to conquer and destroy Serbia, an unstable neighbour which sought to expand beyond its borders into Austro-Hungarian territories. Serbia, exhausted by the two Balkan wars of 1912-13 in which it had played a major role, did not want war in 1914.
Broader European war ensued because German political and military figures egged on Austria-Hungary, Germany's ally, to attack Serbia. This alarmed Russia, Serbia's supporter, which put its armies on a war footing before all options for peace had been fully exhausted.
This frightened Germany into pre-emptively declaring war on Russia and on Russia's ally France and launching a brutal invasion, partly via Belgium, thereby bringing in Britain, a defender of Belgian neutrality and supporter of France.
John Rohl - emeritus professor of history, University of Sussex
Austria-Hungary and Germany
WW1 did not break out by accident or because diplomacy failed. It broke out as the result of a conspiracy between the governments of imperial Germany and Austria-Hungary to bring about war, albeit in the hope that Britain would stay out.
Kaiser Wilhelm II was eventually forced to abdicate
After 25 years of domination by Kaiser Wilhelm II with his angry, autocratic and militaristic personality, his belief in the clairvoyance of all crowned heads, his disdain for diplomats and his conviction that his Germanic God had predestined him to lead his country to greatness, the 20 or so men he had appointed to decide the policy of the Reich opted for war in 1914 in what they deemed to be favourable circumstances.
Germany's military and naval leaders, the predominant influence at court, shared a devil-may-care militarism that held war to be inevitable, time to be running out, and - like their Austrian counterparts - believed it would be better to go down fighting than to go on tolerating what they regarded as the humiliating status quo. In the spring of 1914, this small group of men in Berlin decided to make "the leap into the dark" which they knew their support for an Austrian attack on Serbia would almost certainly entail.
The fine-tuning of the crisis was left to the civilian chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, whose primary aim was to subvert diplomatic intervention in order to begin the war under the most favourable conditions possible. In particular, he wanted to convince his own people that Germany was under attack and to keep Britain out of the conflict.
Gerhard Hirschfeld - professor of modern and contemporary history, University of Stuttgart
Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Britain and Serbia
Long before the outbreak of hostilities Prussian-German conservative elites were convinced that a European war would help to fulfil Germany's ambitions for colonies and for military as well as political prestige in the world.
Britain could have done more to avert war argue some
The actual decision to go to war over a relatively minor international crisis like the Sarajevo murder, however, resulted from a fatal mixture of political misjudgement, fear of loss of prestige and stubborn commitments on all sides of a very complicated system of military and political alliances of European states.
In contrast to the historian Fritz Fischer who saw German war aims - in particular the infamous September Programme of 1914 with its far-reaching economic and territorial demands - at the core of the German government's decision to go to war, most historians nowadays dismiss this interpretation as being far too narrow. They tend to place German war aims, or incidentally all other belligerent nations' war aims, in the context of military events and political developments during the war.
Dr Annika Mombauer - The Open University
Austria-Hungary and Germany
Whole libraries have been filled with the riddle of 1914. Was the war an accident or design, inevitable or planned, caused by sleepwalkers or arsonists? To my mind the war was no accident and it could have been avoided in July 1914. In Vienna the government and military leaders wanted a war against Serbia. The immediate reaction to the murder of Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 was to seek redress from Serbia, which was thought to have been behind the assassination plot and which had been threatening Austria-Hungary's standing in the Balkans for some time. Crucially, a diplomatic victory was considered worthless and "odious". At the beginning of July, Austria's decision-makers chose war.
Germany recalled Hindenburg, centre, from retirement when war broke out
But in order to implement their war against Serbia they needed support from their main ally Germany. Without Germany, their decision to fight against Serbia could not have been implemented. The Berlin government issued a "blank cheque" to its ally, promising unconditional support and putting pressure on Vienna to seize this golden opportunity. Both governments knew it was almost certain that Russia would come to Serbia's aid and this would turn a local war into a European one, but they were willing to take this risk.
Germany's guarantee made it possible for Vienna to proceed with its plans - a "no" from Berlin would have stopped the crisis in its tracks. With some delay Vienna presented an ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July which was deliberately unacceptable. This was because Austria-Hungary was bent on a war and Germany encouraged it because the opportunity seemed perfect. Victory still seemed possible whereas in a few years' time Russia and France would have become invincible. Out of a mixture of desperation and over-confidence the decision-makers of Austria-Hungary and Germany unleashed a war to preserve and expand their empires. The war that ensued would be their downfall.
Sean McMeekin - assistant professor of history at Koc University, Istanbul
Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Britain and Serbia
It is human nature to seek simple, satisfying answers, which is why the German war guilt thesis endures today.
Without Berlin's encouragement of a strong Austro-Hungarian line against Serbia after Sarajevo - the "blank cheque" - WW1 would clearly not have broken out. So Germany does bear responsibility.
But it is equally true that absent a terrorist plot launched in Belgrade the Germans and Austrians would not have faced this terrible choice. Civilian leaders in both Berlin and Vienna tried to "localise" conflict in the Balkans. It was Russia's decision - after Petersburg received its own "blank cheque" from Paris - to Europeanise the Austro-Serbian showdown which produced first a European and then - following Britain's entry - world conflagration. Russia, not Germany, mobilised first.
The resulting war, with France and Britain backing Serbia and Russia against two Central Powers, was Russia's desired outcome, not Germany's. Still, none of the powers can escape blame. All five Great Power belligerents, along with Serbia, unleashed Armageddon.
Prof Gary Sheffield - professor of war studies, University of Wolverhampton
Austria-Hungary and Germany
The war was started by the leaders of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Vienna seized the opportunity presented by the assassination of the archduke to attempt to destroy its Balkan rival Serbia. This was done in the full knowledge that Serbia's protector Russia was unlikely to stand by and this might lead to a general European war.
Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph I and Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm II were allies
Germany gave Austria unconditional support in its actions, again fully aware of the likely consequences. Germany sought to break up the French-Russian alliance and was fully prepared to take the risk that this would bring about a major war. Some in the German elite welcomed the prospect of beginning an expansionist war of conquest. The response of Russia, France and later Britain were reactive and defensive.
The best that can be said of German and Austrian leaders in the July crisis is that they took criminal risks with world peace.
Dr Catriona Pennell - senior lecturer in history, University of Exeter
Austria-Hungary and Germany
In my opinion, it is the political and diplomatic decision-makers in Germany and Austria-Hungary who must carry the burden of responsibility for expanding a localised Balkan conflict into a European and, eventually, global war. Germany, suffering from something of a "younger child" complex in the family of European empires, saw an opportunity to reconfigure the balance of power in their favour via an aggressive war of conquest.
Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914
On 5 July 1914 it issued the "blank cheque" of unconditional support to the crumbling Austro-Hungarian Empire (trying to reassert its dominance over the rebellious Serbia), despite the likelihood of this sparking war with Russia, an ally of France and Great Britain. However, Austria-Hungary's actions should not be ignored.
The ultimatum it issued to Serbia on 23 July was composed in such a way that its possibility of being accepted was near impossible. Serbia's rejection paved the way for Austria-Hungary to declare war on 28 July, thus beginning WW1.
David Stevenson - professor of international history, LSE
Germany
The largest share of responsibility lies with the German government. Germany's rulers made possible a Balkan war by urging Austria-Hungary to invade Serbia, well understanding that such a conflict might escalate. Without German backing it is unlikely that Austria-Hungary would have acted so drastically.
They also started wider European hostilities by sending ultimata to Russia and France, and by declaring war when those ultimata were rejected - indeed fabricating a pretext that French aircraft had bombed Nuremberg.
Finally, they violated international treaties by invading Luxemburg and Belgium knowing that the latter violation was virtually certain to bring in Britain. This is neither to deny that there were mitigating circumstances nor to contend that German responsibility was sole.
Serbia subjected Austria-Hungary to extraordinary provocation and two sides were needed for armed conflict. Although the Central Powers took the initiative, the Russian government, with French encouragement, was willing to respond.
In contrast, while Britain might have helped avert hostilities by clarifying its position earlier, this responsibility - even disregarding the domestic political obstacles to an alternative course - was passive rather than active.
Germany
No one nation deserves all responsibility for the outbreak of war, but Germany seems to me to deserve most.
It alone had power to halt the descent to disaster at any time in July 1914 by withdrawing its "blank cheque" which offered support to Austria for its invasion of Serbia.
I'm afraid I am unconvinced by the argument that Serbia was a rogue state which deserved its nemesis at Austria's hands. And I do not believe Russia wanted a European war in 1914 - its leaders knew that it would have been in a far stronger position to fight two years later, having completed its rearmament programme.
The question of whether Britain was obliged to join the European conflict which became inevitable by 1 August is almost a separate issue. In my own view neutrality was not a credible option because a Germany victorious on the continent would never afterwards have accommodated a Britain which still dominated the oceans and global financial system.
Sir Richard J Evans - Regius professor of history, University of Cambridge
Serbia
Serbia bore the greatest responsibility for the outbreak of WW1. Serbian nationalism and expansionism were profoundly disruptive forces and Serbian backing for the Black Hand terrorists was extraordinarily irresponsible. Austria-Hungary bore only slightly less responsibility for its panic over-reaction to the assassination of the heir to the Habsburg throne.
France encouraged Russia's aggressiveness towards Austria-Hungary and Germany encouraged Austrian intransigence. Britain failed to mediate as it had done in the previous Balkan crisis out of fear of Germany's European and global ambitions - a fear that was not entirely rational since Britain had clearly won the naval arms race by 1910.
Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria
The generally positive attitude of European statesmen towards war, based on notions of honour, expectations of a swift victory, and ideas of social Darwinism, was perhaps the most important conditioning factor. It is very important to look at the outbreak of the war in the round and to avoid reading back later developments - the German September Programme for example (an early statement of their war aims) - into the events of July-August 1914.
Dr Heather Jones - associate professor in international history, LSEAustria-Hungary,
Germany and Russia
A handful of bellicose political and military decision-makers in Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia caused WW1.
Relatively common before 1914, assassinations of royal figures did not normally result in war. But Austria-Hungary's military hawks - principal culprits for the conflict - saw the Sarajevo assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife by a Bosnian Serb as an excuse to conquer and destroy Serbia, an unstable neighbour which sought to expand beyond its borders into Austro-Hungarian territories. Serbia, exhausted by the two Balkan wars of 1912-13 in which it had played a major role, did not want war in 1914.
Broader European war ensued because German political and military figures egged on Austria-Hungary, Germany's ally, to attack Serbia. This alarmed Russia, Serbia's supporter, which put its armies on a war footing before all options for peace had been fully exhausted.
This frightened Germany into pre-emptively declaring war on Russia and on Russia's ally France and launching a brutal invasion, partly via Belgium, thereby bringing in Britain, a defender of Belgian neutrality and supporter of France.
John Rohl - emeritus professor of history, University of Sussex
Austria-Hungary and Germany
WW1 did not break out by accident or because diplomacy failed. It broke out as the result of a conspiracy between the governments of imperial Germany and Austria-Hungary to bring about war, albeit in the hope that Britain would stay out.
Kaiser Wilhelm II was eventually forced to abdicate
After 25 years of domination by Kaiser Wilhelm II with his angry, autocratic and militaristic personality, his belief in the clairvoyance of all crowned heads, his disdain for diplomats and his conviction that his Germanic God had predestined him to lead his country to greatness, the 20 or so men he had appointed to decide the policy of the Reich opted for war in 1914 in what they deemed to be favourable circumstances.
Germany's military and naval leaders, the predominant influence at court, shared a devil-may-care militarism that held war to be inevitable, time to be running out, and - like their Austrian counterparts - believed it would be better to go down fighting than to go on tolerating what they regarded as the humiliating status quo. In the spring of 1914, this small group of men in Berlin decided to make "the leap into the dark" which they knew their support for an Austrian attack on Serbia would almost certainly entail.
The fine-tuning of the crisis was left to the civilian chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, whose primary aim was to subvert diplomatic intervention in order to begin the war under the most favourable conditions possible. In particular, he wanted to convince his own people that Germany was under attack and to keep Britain out of the conflict.
Gerhard Hirschfeld - professor of modern and contemporary history, University of Stuttgart
Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Britain and Serbia
Long before the outbreak of hostilities Prussian-German conservative elites were convinced that a European war would help to fulfil Germany's ambitions for colonies and for military as well as political prestige in the world.
Britain could have done more to avert war argue some
The actual decision to go to war over a relatively minor international crisis like the Sarajevo murder, however, resulted from a fatal mixture of political misjudgement, fear of loss of prestige and stubborn commitments on all sides of a very complicated system of military and political alliances of European states.
In contrast to the historian Fritz Fischer who saw German war aims - in particular the infamous September Programme of 1914 with its far-reaching economic and territorial demands - at the core of the German government's decision to go to war, most historians nowadays dismiss this interpretation as being far too narrow. They tend to place German war aims, or incidentally all other belligerent nations' war aims, in the context of military events and political developments during the war.
Dr Annika Mombauer - The Open University
Austria-Hungary and Germany
Whole libraries have been filled with the riddle of 1914. Was the war an accident or design, inevitable or planned, caused by sleepwalkers or arsonists? To my mind the war was no accident and it could have been avoided in July 1914. In Vienna the government and military leaders wanted a war against Serbia. The immediate reaction to the murder of Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 was to seek redress from Serbia, which was thought to have been behind the assassination plot and which had been threatening Austria-Hungary's standing in the Balkans for some time. Crucially, a diplomatic victory was considered worthless and "odious". At the beginning of July, Austria's decision-makers chose war.
Germany recalled Hindenburg, centre, from retirement when war broke out
But in order to implement their war against Serbia they needed support from their main ally Germany. Without Germany, their decision to fight against Serbia could not have been implemented. The Berlin government issued a "blank cheque" to its ally, promising unconditional support and putting pressure on Vienna to seize this golden opportunity. Both governments knew it was almost certain that Russia would come to Serbia's aid and this would turn a local war into a European one, but they were willing to take this risk.
Germany's guarantee made it possible for Vienna to proceed with its plans - a "no" from Berlin would have stopped the crisis in its tracks. With some delay Vienna presented an ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July which was deliberately unacceptable. This was because Austria-Hungary was bent on a war and Germany encouraged it because the opportunity seemed perfect. Victory still seemed possible whereas in a few years' time Russia and France would have become invincible. Out of a mixture of desperation and over-confidence the decision-makers of Austria-Hungary and Germany unleashed a war to preserve and expand their empires. The war that ensued would be their downfall.
Sean McMeekin - assistant professor of history at Koc University, Istanbul
Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Britain and Serbia
It is human nature to seek simple, satisfying answers, which is why the German war guilt thesis endures today.
Without Berlin's encouragement of a strong Austro-Hungarian line against Serbia after Sarajevo - the "blank cheque" - WW1 would clearly not have broken out. So Germany does bear responsibility.
But it is equally true that absent a terrorist plot launched in Belgrade the Germans and Austrians would not have faced this terrible choice. Civilian leaders in both Berlin and Vienna tried to "localise" conflict in the Balkans. It was Russia's decision - after Petersburg received its own "blank cheque" from Paris - to Europeanise the Austro-Serbian showdown which produced first a European and then - following Britain's entry - world conflagration. Russia, not Germany, mobilised first.
The resulting war, with France and Britain backing Serbia and Russia against two Central Powers, was Russia's desired outcome, not Germany's. Still, none of the powers can escape blame. All five Great Power belligerents, along with Serbia, unleashed Armageddon.
Prof Gary Sheffield - professor of war studies, University of Wolverhampton
Austria-Hungary and Germany
The war was started by the leaders of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Vienna seized the opportunity presented by the assassination of the archduke to attempt to destroy its Balkan rival Serbia. This was done in the full knowledge that Serbia's protector Russia was unlikely to stand by and this might lead to a general European war.
Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph I and Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm II were allies
Germany gave Austria unconditional support in its actions, again fully aware of the likely consequences. Germany sought to break up the French-Russian alliance and was fully prepared to take the risk that this would bring about a major war. Some in the German elite welcomed the prospect of beginning an expansionist war of conquest. The response of Russia, France and later Britain were reactive and defensive.
The best that can be said of German and Austrian leaders in the July crisis is that they took criminal risks with world peace.
Dr Catriona Pennell - senior lecturer in history, University of Exeter
Austria-Hungary and Germany
In my opinion, it is the political and diplomatic decision-makers in Germany and Austria-Hungary who must carry the burden of responsibility for expanding a localised Balkan conflict into a European and, eventually, global war. Germany, suffering from something of a "younger child" complex in the family of European empires, saw an opportunity to reconfigure the balance of power in their favour via an aggressive war of conquest.
Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914
On 5 July 1914 it issued the "blank cheque" of unconditional support to the crumbling Austro-Hungarian Empire (trying to reassert its dominance over the rebellious Serbia), despite the likelihood of this sparking war with Russia, an ally of France and Great Britain. However, Austria-Hungary's actions should not be ignored.
The ultimatum it issued to Serbia on 23 July was composed in such a way that its possibility of being accepted was near impossible. Serbia's rejection paved the way for Austria-Hungary to declare war on 28 July, thus beginning WW1.
David Stevenson - professor of international history, LSE
Germany
The largest share of responsibility lies with the German government. Germany's rulers made possible a Balkan war by urging Austria-Hungary to invade Serbia, well understanding that such a conflict might escalate. Without German backing it is unlikely that Austria-Hungary would have acted so drastically.
They also started wider European hostilities by sending ultimata to Russia and France, and by declaring war when those ultimata were rejected - indeed fabricating a pretext that French aircraft had bombed Nuremberg.
Finally, they violated international treaties by invading Luxemburg and Belgium knowing that the latter violation was virtually certain to bring in Britain. This is neither to deny that there were mitigating circumstances nor to contend that German responsibility was sole.
Serbia subjected Austria-Hungary to extraordinary provocation and two sides were needed for armed conflict. Although the Central Powers took the initiative, the Russian government, with French encouragement, was willing to respond.
In contrast, while Britain might have helped avert hostilities by clarifying its position earlier, this responsibility - even disregarding the domestic political obstacles to an alternative course - was passive rather than active.